"The times they are a-changing": reflections on the crisis of personal and collective identities by Adamthwaite, A. (Anthony)
"THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGING": 




Abstract: This paper reviews the main twentieth century changes that have 
shaped the contemporary crisis of identity. After exploring four hurricanes of 
modernity - total war; the cultural revolution ofthe 1960s; modernization and 
globalization; and the rise of the information society -1 discuss the decline of 
trust in civil society. Personal identities once tightlyfocused onfamily,friends 
and neighborhood, are now much looser connections with the emphasis on so-
cial networking. The process is one of individualization, subjectivization, and 
self-realization. Collective identities are experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. 
ldeologies, associations, mainstream churches and nation-states have lost 
their mobilizing power. 1 argue that globalization in a network society offers a 
possible solution to the crisis. Until recently domestic and international poli-
tics, save in times of war, seemed separate worlds. In the twenty first century 
they form one continuum. Cosmopolitan politics with its advocacy of a global 
civil society offers not only an opportunity to reconnect individual and collec-
tive identities in a new and purposeful way but to respond to the demand for 
justice worldwide. 
Contents: 1: Introduction, 2. Total War, 3. Cultural Revolution, 4. Modemiza-
tion and Globalization, 5. The decline of trust , 6. The information society, 7. 
Conclusion: A Global Civil Society? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is an honor and a great pleasure to be invited to speak at this 
symposium on Cambio cultural y Cambio social. 1 have been 10-
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oking forward very much to my first visit to Pamplona and the 
campus - regretting somewhat that the Symposium did not coin-
cide with the "Sanfermines". Perhaps this is just as well since I 
might have been put out of action before giving my paper! 
The paper begins by reviewing the main social, political, cul-
tural and economic changes that have contributed to the contem-
porary sense of a crisis of identity. To be sure, there is material 
here for several symposia. Although what I have to say in the 
time available is necessarily brief and selective, it will be enough, 
I hope, to provoke questions for discussion. Four hurricanes of 
change are explored: total war; modemization anp globalization; 
the cultural revolution of the 1960s; the rise of the information 
society. Personal identities once tightIy focused on family, friends 
and neighborhood, are now much loo ser connections, with the 
emphasis on social networking. The process is one of individua-
lization, subjectivization, and self-realization. Collective identi-
ties are experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. Ideologies, as socia-
tions, mainstream churches and nation-states ,have lost their 
mobilizing power. largue that globalization in a network society 
offers a possible solution to the crisis. Until recentIy domestic 
and intemational politics, save in times of war, seemed separate 
worlds. In the twenty first century they form one continuum. Cos-
mopolitan politics with its advocacy of global civil society provi-
des an opportunity not only to reconnect individual and collecti-
ve identities in a meaningful and purposeful way but also to 
respond to the call for justice worldwide. 
Three caveats. FirstIy an obvious disclaimer. My approach is 
that of a historian, focusing on the impact of twentieth century 
upheavals. Philosophers, sociologists and poli tic al scientists 
would offer you different perspectives1 • For the purpose of this 
discussion identity is defined as the individual's sen se of being in 
1. For the most recent overview see Daedalus, F all 2006, "On Identity". 
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various ways distinct from others. This self-awareness is cons-
tructed over time from a multiplicity of influences. Second cave-
at. Beginnings and endings in social and cultural history are no-
toriously difficult to pin down. By starting with the world wars I 
do not wish to imply that aH significant change began in 1914. 
Many antecedents of post-1914 developments are in evidence 
from the 1890s. The women's movement? for example, develops 
in the nineteenth century. Lastly, the unevenness of aH historical 
change. Over the past century the pace of social and cultural 
change varied hugely across countries, regions, and continents, 
for instance, Europe in the 1960s offered striking contrasts bet-
ween social .democracies and the authoritarian regimes of Spain 
and Portugal, and between Communist Eastern Europe and the 
West. The foHowing analysis draws mostly on examples from 
North America and Western Europe. 
2. TOTAL WAR 
The experience of total war in the first half of last century pro-
foundly influenced European identities2 • Major neutral s like 
Spain, as the CivilWar demonstrated, could not escape the casca-
de of violence and ideology. Sorne historians view the war of 
1914 as the beginning of a thirty years war in Europe. Stefan 
Zweig's memo ir The World ofYesterday (1946) evoked a sense 
of a lost world. The slaughter shook belief in nationalism, na-
tion-state and church, subverting post-Enlightenment assump-
tions of progressive moral and material improvement. The wars 
reordered the contract between state and citizen. In 1914 to fight 
for one's country was a civic duty. Indeed, the Italian Futurist em-
2. A film that depicts with skill and humour the opportunities war offers 
for the invention of identity is A Self-Styled Hero (Un HerosTres Discret, 
1996). 
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phasis on war as a positive value, an affirrnation of life and man-
hood, cornmanded wide appeal. A peasant mother waved farewell 
to her son, saying war "will make aman of you". The awful des-
tructiveness of industrialized killing challenged the old absolutes 
of patriotism and organized religion. British Nurse Edith Cavell 
voiced this shift in values on the eve of her execution in 1915: 
"patriotism is not enough". The questioning of received values is 
captured in another incident. An English school on Arrnistice Day 
November 1918 organized a Thanksgiving Service. "When the 
national anthem was played one girl refused to stand up. The he-
admaster asked why. 'All the other little boys and girls' Daddies 
would be coming home now; but her Daddy would never come 
home again. She was caned for disobedience"3. 
Nationalism, stripped of the old "my country right or wrong" 
attitude, was further diluted by internationalism, 10ya1ty to the 
League of Nations, collective security and disarmament. In the 
1920s and 1930s youth and veteran exchanges between former 
enemies aimed at forging an international community based on 
face to face contacts, goodwill and cooperation. Universities ga-
thered home and foreign students together in purpose built hou-
sing like the Cite Universitaire, Paris (1924), and International 
Houses in the USA. Total war reconfigured attitudes to the state 
and conflicto Revulsion from war refueled the nineteenth century 
peace movement, raising its profile and influence. In both con-
flicts governments used the carrot of a better world to mobilize 
electorates. Britain's Beveridge Plan (1942) offered a welfare sta-
te blueprint. As a result, the contract between state and citizen 
was renegotiated. The night watchman state of 1914 had prornised 
internal order and protection from external attack but precious lit-
tle else. By 1945 the double failure of interwar democracies to 
prevent not only war but mass unemployment and economic mi-
3. Cited Mark MAZOWER, Dark Continent; Europe's Twentieth Century, 
New York, 1999,253. 
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sery ensured the rise of a West European welfare state. Citizens 
now expected rulers to deliver social goods: prosperity, employ-
ment, and welfare. 
The catastrophe of 1939-1945 discredited European nationa-
lism. Manifestly the nation state had not saved its citizens from 
death and occupation. Moreover, dependence on an American 
Cold War shield of conventional and nuclear arms underscored 
the inability to deliver security. Integration carne to the rescue. As 
the state reinvented itself in the European Economic Community 
so did its citizens. Gone was the 100% commitment to fight for 
one's country. After 1945 Europeans expressed increasing reluc-
tance to go to war. Conscription has long since disappeared. The 
citizen -state relationship has become only one allegiance among 
many-. Globalloyalties often come first -the future of the planet, 
and causes like Amnesty Intemational and Greenpeace-. 
War brought lasting change to women and the family. The 
Great War produced an assertive and emancipated "new woman" 
whose demands for softer and more sensitive "new men" led to 
conflicts between the sexes in the aftermath of a conflict which 
many males viewed as an assertion of their virility. Despite ef-
forts in the 1930s and 1950s to re-emphasize women as homema-
kers, by the 1970s women confidently asserted a new identity of 
autonomy and social and economic equality with meno The tradi-
tional patriarchic family of wives subject to husbands and chil-
dren subject to parents encountered attack in other ways. The sur-
ge in divorces beginning after World War 1 and the rise of the 
nuclear family gave women more freedom. Between the wars 
greater use of artificial contraceptives and growing prosperity es-
tablished the family of two children as the norm. The joke of the 
time was that British parents rather than have another child opted 
for the "baby Austin" - Britain's first small car for the masses. 
Broken marriages and the rise of the nuclear family heralded the 
end of the large extended family of numerous aunts, uncles and 
cousins. 
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3. CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
From Berkeley to Paris the cultural revolution of the 1960s 
metamorphosed attitudes and assumptions in Europe and North 
America. To be sure, not everything of importance occurred wi-
thin the sixties. Historian Arthur Marwick's The Sixties (1998) 
stretches the decade to the years 1958-1974. Distinctive features 
inc1uded Vatican 11; black civil rights; youth culture; protest and 
rebellion; the triumph of popular music as a universallanguage; 
the challenge to censorship and authority; massive changes in 
personal relationships and sexual behavior; a new audacity and 
frankness in books, in the media and in everyday behavior; the 
new feminism; gay liberation; the emergence of a counterculture; 
optimism and faith in the dawning of a better world. 
While the influence and importance of sorne of these develop-
ments may be debatable , their overall revolutionary impact is in-
contestable. Indeed, the legacy is now so much taken for granted 
that it 's hard to recapture the pre-sixties atmosphere of deference 
to authority and hierarchy. Two small personal memories of the 
time might help. At my university students were forbidden to use 
the lifts. While forcing students to c1imb several flights of stairs 
might improve their health it does little for campus community 
relations. One day 1 had the temerity to enter a lift and carne face 
to face with a senior academic who said loudly "What young pro-
fessors we have these days!" Visiting the Sorbonne 1 noticed that 
French professors had keys to their lifts. Second recollection. As 
a novice teacher 1 attended my first departmental meeting. The 
senior professor presided at the head of a long tableo Entering the 
room 1 slipped into an empty seat half way down the table only to 
be told to sit at the end! 
Perceptions of personal and collective identity became much 
more fluid. Egalitarianism ruled. Television shows mocked au-
thority figures. Clothes, accents and body language, always-
strong markers of identity and status, lost their power. Blue jeans 
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served as a universal classless uniform for both sexes. The death 
of a dress code can be dated to a single year. Staying at a Cam-
bridge College I glanced at old photographs of entering freshman 
during the 1960s. New undergraduates had an official group pho-
tograph. Until the mid-60s all wore dark suits, white shirt and tie; 
from 1967 casual dress took over. In Britain until the 1960s the 
BBC banned regional accents; almost ovemight provincial voices 
were OK. Upper class youth practiced a kind of inverted snob-
bery by adopting Cockney accents. The defeat of the attempt to 
stop publication of D.H.Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover 
(1960) on the grounds of obscenity signaled the collapse of state 
censorship. The sense of sexualliberation is neatly caught in Bri-
tish poet Philip Larkin's remark: "Sexual intercourse began in 
1961". A new anti-war movement CND (Complete Nuclear Di-
sarmament) extended post-1918 condemnations ofwar. The sava-
ge satire and comic humor of Dr Strangelove; or, How Ilearned 
to stop worrying and love the bomb (1963) replaced the solemn 
and earnest tone of classic anti-war statements like All Quiet on 
the Western Front (1928). 
That Vatican 11 changed the identity of modem Catholicism is 
a truism. Yet the jury is still out on the Council's lasting signifi-
canee. What did it mean for the experience of the ordained mi-
nistry at the time? One of my high school teachers, an English Je-
suit, recalled his personal transformation: 
In January 1968 I was Fr Edwards, a c1eric in a long black gown, 
a Deputy-Head who knew that a sixthformer's hair should not stick over 
the back of his collar. By October 1969 I had dropped the prefix "Father", 
was called "Paul" by almost everyone, and had bought a pair of warm, 
very cornfortable, but quite graceless jeans. And I no longer knew how long 
or how short anybody's hair should be ... 4 
4. Paul EOWAROS, Canute's Tower: St Beuno's 1848-1989 (Worcester 
1990),141. 
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One outcome of the Council was to delegitimatize Church au-
thority, witness the furore over the encyclical Humanae Vitae 
(1968). No Catholic writer had publicly questioned the Church's 
traditional teaching before 1963. In fact there is a continuing cri-
sis of identity within the Church -institutional and individual-
with the emergence of traditionalists and liberal s arguing over the 
desirability of the Tridentine Mass and much else. For many rank 
and file Catholics the rapid post-Conciliar abandonment in many 
dioceses of long-standing devotions like the Adoration of the 
Blessed Sacrament, Benediction and Rosary generated confusion 
and doubt. Now the wheel has come fuB circle. In Berkeley my 
own Newman Holy Spirit parish, which always prides itself on 
being "progressive", has recently reintroduced Benediction, and 
Adoration! One result of greater liturgical diversity is the growth 
of consumer culture within the Church. Just as shoppers pick and 
mix merchandise so people look for a local church, which fits 
their perceived life style. Thus Catholic identities become loo se 
and fragmented. 
4. MODERNIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION 
Modernization gathered speed in mid-twentieth century, rein-
forcing the impact of total war. The story is one of the adoption of 
modern technology in the broadest sense, including medie al ad-
vanees and rational management of industry andbureaucracy. 
Mass consumer society gave most people more money, better he-
alth, longer lives and leisure. But there was a price to pay, the ero-
sion of family unity and group solidarity. Migration from 
countryside to town and across Europe replaced what Marx and 
Engels caBed "the idiocy of rurallife" with an anonymous urban 
environment, offering multiple possibilities. Prosperity gave peo-
pIe options that only the rich had had in the past. Britons for 
example, bought second homes in Spain and France. Rapid ex-
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pansion of state funded hígher education in the 1960s, together 
with additionalleisure and the advent of cheap package tourism 
further weakened loyalties to family, cornrnunity and social c1ass. 
A French student living on a state grant in Paris talked of his new 
life: "Money problems 1 have known since childhood. Here for 
me, it's a palace. It's luxury! ... Living in the city has, thanks to 
contact with other people ... allowed me to lose my blinkers, 1 have 
changed ... "5 
The golden age of prosperity from 1945 to the mid-1970s gua-
ranteed full employment and sustained economic growth_ The 
crash carne in the mid-1970s. The oil price hikes and the devalua-
tion of the US dollar revealed western capitalism's vulnerability 
to the outside world. The restructuring of the 1980s emphasized 
globalization, the need to stay competitive in an increasingly in-
tegrated and predatory world economy. The idea of social pro-
gress as a collective project based on the accumulation of goods 
lost its attraction. The Limits to Growth -the 1972 manifesto of 
the Club of Rome- sold ten million copies, marking a new envi-
ronmental and conservationist consciousness. Ecological move-
ments like the Green party in West Germany were the new ex-
pression of disaffection with the degradation of the environment. 
Many of the great manufacturing centers of Europe fell into de-
cline. The sharp economic downturn and the response of Reaga-
nornics and Thatcherism had important consequences for personal 
and collective identity. The ruthless downsizing of manufacturing 
and coal mining wiped out whole cornrnunities . Glimpses into the 
plight of British coal miners and steel workers can be found in the 
popular films Billy Elliot (2000) and The Full Monty (1997). 
The era of collective political mobilization was superseded by 
more fragmented forrns of politics. Ties to c1ass, trade unions and 
political parties atrophied. Politics centered less on c1ass and 
5. MARWICK, The Sixties, London 1998,557. 
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more on "identity" issues. By the 1980s a debate on "national", 
"cultural", and "gender" identity had begun. Race and immigra-
tion issues moved centre stage. The large influx of non-European 
immigrants, especially Moslems, raised fundamental questions 
about national identity. Should a state pursue multiculturalist or 
assimilationist policies? How should Britishness or Frenchness 
be defined? One prominent social theorist Anthony Giddens tal-
ked about the advent of what he called "life politics" in which 
"self and body became the sites of a variety of life-style op-
tions"6. The rethinking of gender roles, which began in the 1960s, 
achieved its greatest legislative impact in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Divorce laws were liberalized and the legal equality of husbands 
and wives reaffirmed. The 1977 West German Marriage Law 
scrapped the c1ause, which permitted a wife to work only with 
her husband's permission. In the 1980s civil marriage was legali-
zed in Greece, and women gained rights in Spain and Portugal fo-
llowing the collapse of the Franco and Salazar dictatorships. Ma-
rriage itself was being repackaged as a choice rather than a duty 
and as a limited commitment. In 1960 one in four American ma-
rriages would fail, today one in two will. 
Sorne commentators argued that Westem consumer capitalism, 
by forcing people to live at a dizzying pace, had created a sort of 
existential crisis. People were harangued by "experts" and thus 
encouraged to mistrust their own intuitions, and presented with 
"identities" to select and discard at random. The result, it was 
c1aimed, was an increasing sense of anomie, manifesting itself in 
growing fear, on the one hand, and a sporadic search for "genuine-
ness" on the other. The multiple identities offered by post-indus-
trial society had spawned an obsession with "roots" and "herita-
ges" among a politically immobilized electorate, too sophisticated 
any longer to trust the media, and deprived of any dependable 
6. Modernity and Self-Identity. London 1991,225. 
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sources of knowledge. Television opened up a world of images, 
but robbed personal experience of its aut)Jenticity. The spread of 
astrology, New Age philosophies and other forrns of irrationalism 
reflected this growing anxiety in the face of an uninterpretable 
world. Journalists talked of the "fretful 1990s" when fear is the 
new badge of citizenship. 
This picture of postmodern angst has sorne validity but the de-
gree of alienation can be exaggerated. What had happened was 
that politics was no longer regarded as the prime area for perso-
nal fulfillment or action. Voter apathy and abstention were on the 
increase, and party memberships dropped. The ranks of the pasa-
tas increased. In Belgium, Italy, France and Britain corruption 
scandals rocked public confidence in political elites. Part of the 
problem was that as a result of globalization patterns of employ-
ment and personal relations were more varied and less settled 
than ever before. Greater choice inevitably meant greater uncer-
tainty, increasedindividualism reduced the opportunity for co-
llective mobilization. The great demonstrations and marches of 
the past grew more and more sporadic: mass groupings of people 
were more likely to be generated by sports events and pop festi-
vals. Individualism opened up a world of vulnerability to risks, 
which had formerly been countered with familial, local or natio-
nal solidarities. 
5. THE DECLINE OF TRUST 
Turning now to attitudes towards politics and government. A 
prime problem is the hollowing out of legitimizing identities in 
the public sphere. The following remarks are largely based on 
changes in British and North American society. Spain's experien-
ce may be quite different and I should welcome your comments. 
The public domain of citizenship is crucial both for individual 
fulfillment and the well being of democracy and society gene-
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rally. In America and increasingly in other developed nations pe-
ople are not plugged in very tightly to groups and associations, 
they may volunteer a few hours a week for a while, but they will 
not join an organization which will expect their loyalty and com-
mitment for the long haul, or at least they are much more reluc-
tant than they once were. Even commitment to marriage and fa-
mily, leaving aside job and vocation, are much more fragile, 
much more dependent on individual mood than they used to be. 
In part this situation reflects porous institutions. In a world of po-
rous institutions it is hard to have any connections that are not 10-
ose. 
British political scientist David Marquand's Decline ofthe Pu-
blic (2004) identifies one cause of the weakening of the public 
domain. He contends persuasively that in Britain over the last 
thirty years interventionist government policies of the New Right 
under Thatcher and the New Left under Blair have undermined 
systematically the culture of service and citizenship. The outco-
me is the rise of a culture of distrust of traditional institutions, 
aboye all of politics and government. But there are other reasons 
for the corrosion of public life. One is the non-democratic nature 
of the post-1945 international system. Today's global economic 
order was a great achievement in its time. It now operates, howe-
ver, in such a manner that it manifestly undermines trust between 
different nations, and especially between the affluent Western (in 
part East Asian) world and the resto 
Another reason for disillusionment has been the failure of ide-
ologies and redemptive politics to ensure a better world. The gulf 
between rich and poor countries grows apace. In many parts of 
Africa quality of life and conditions generally are worse than un-
der European colonialist rule. In the United States, the richest and 
most advanced nation, over 40 million cannot afford health insu-
rance. In Britain social mobility between c1asses has dec1ined for 
several decades. Above all, tardy and quite inadequate govern-
mental responses to c1imate change threaten irreversible damage 
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to large areas of the world by the end of the century. 
Moreover, what has also contributed to the breakdown of trust 
is the perception that politica1leaders have not hesitated to misle-
ad electorates. The late 1950s and 1960s brought a surge in poli-
tical mendacity in Britain and the United States: official denials 
of collusion with Israel in the Suez crisis of 1956; denial of the 
Bay of Pigs fiasco 1961; the Tonkin Gulf incident tricking Ame-
rica into the Vietnam war; the multiple deceptions of Watergate. 
Sorne would argue that this is nothing new-political mendacity 
has flourished since Machiavelli. The apparent surge in menda-
city, lt is contended, reflects the greater transparency of Western 
democracy. Politicians who in the past would not have been 
found out are now quickly exposed. However this explanation 
does not get to grips with the issue. Ruling elites may have lied 
extensively in past centuries but we do not know for sure. What 
is certain is the surge in mendacity in the second half of the twen-
tieth century. I would argue that the surge represents a new and 
real phenomenon that reflects the contradictions of pluralist de-
mocracies. The continual balancing of interests between different 
constituencies in the electorate means that certain tensions cannot 
be fully resolved. Politicians attempt to paper over the cracks and 
in this sense lying may be a useful and necessary strategy. Howe-
ver over time the cumulative effect is to destroy confidence in the 
democratic process. 
6. THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
Finally I want to turn to the information society.lts basis is the 
explosive growth in the accessibility of knowledge since the early 
1990s.lt's not that we know more than we did a decade or so ago, 
but that we can know more than we did. Today's internet offers 
whole encyc1opedias, journal runs, whole libraries, not to men-
tion much more ephemeral information that in the past would 
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have taken months or years to retrieve if it could have been retrie-
ved at all. What is salient for this discussion is the impact of the 
information age on globalization. Globalization in the economic 
sen se is nothing new.1t has been under way for centuries. What is 
new, however, is that the information revolution has enormously 
accelerated globalization by making every product and every re-
source in the world instantly accessible to everyone-a global mar-
ket place. We live in the world of the "terrific deal" -there is al-
ways something potentially better out there- new gadgetry, 
mobile phone, job, location, house even partners and spouses. 
Finding and switching to something allegedly better is easier to-
day than at any other time in the history of humanity. The compe-
tition and fragmentation of a market society breaks up identities, 
disorientating individual s and communities, drowning them with 
information but offering little or no meaning. Those aged 18-25 
Generation Y are now Generation ME. My Space, web cams, pod 
casting, blogging and social networking by phone encourage 
round the dock updates on all aspects of personallives, nurturing 
a culture of narcissism. Sociologist Manuel Castells considers 
that "the dissolution of shared identities" between generations 
and within civil society "is tantamount to the dissolution of so-
ciety as a meaningful social system" and "may well be the state 
of affairs in our time"? . 
7. CONCLUSION: ¿A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY? 
The contemporary crisis of identity can be summed up in this 
way. At first sight the twin phenomena of globalization and the 
information society appear to have widened and deepened indivi-
dual autonomy by providing numerous altemative life styles and 
virtual communities. But the positive gains carry severe shortéo-
7. ThePowerofldentity , 1997,355. 
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mings_ One is the erosion of the sources of what Castells calls 
"legitimizing identities", family, church, state, and associations 
of civil society. The condensed codes of tradition, the life force of 
societies, are in danger of draining away. There is also an overlo-
ad of information, which leaves people hungry for meaning. 
That people are searching for more spiritual meaning in their 
lives is confirmed in the proliferation of web sites devoted to re-
ligion. Lastly, it is arguable that the appearance of greater indivi-
dual autonomy and self-realization is in fact illusory. In an age of 
terrorism we are part of a surveillance society. Unhappily, domes-
tic and international constraints on the liberty of the individual 
are more extensive today than ever before. People's awareness of 
their inability to influence effectively and decisively the things 
that really matter for the twenty first century -climate change, 
energy supplies, nuclear proliferation, world hunger and human 
rights- has accelerated the hemorrhaging of civil society. 
My vantage point as a specialist in international relations at-
tracts me to possible solutions to the world order, which hold out 
the hope of renewing personal and collective identities. These so-
lutions include what are called cosmopolitan scenarios8 • One of 
these may offer a way forward. The increasing interconnected-
ness of all parts of the world through the global economy gives 
cosmopolitan solutions a growing influence, even if sorne of the 
practical obstacles to their implementation remain severe. What 
is common to them is that they do not rely on the state or the exis-
ting international system, believing that other forces are more 
fundamental in shaping the world order. The scenario I have in 
mind puts the emphasis on global civil society and on cosmopo-
litan democracy, focusing on the way in which new global orga-
nizations, global pressure groups and global campaigns have be-
gun emerging, and the incremental steps through which the 
8. See Jan Aart SCHOLTE, Globalization, 2005;David HELD, Global Cove-
nant, 2004 
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creation of a global polity from the bottom up rnight be construc-
ted. New global forums to allow the voices of all peoples of the 
world, all civilizations to be heard and recognized, new kinds of 
association, a new global politics which would recognize univer-
sal human rights, and allow for the first time the representation of 
all peoples and interests in the governance of the world. This 
pressure for a global civil society would inc1ude existing institu-
tions but go beyond multilateralism. In short to heal fractured 
identity we have to think globally and offer a vision, which will 
restore meaning and justice. Building a global civil society would 
empower us to respond to the world's cry for justice . . 
